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Abstract: We are concerned with the early phases of ER-modeling consisting in the primary conceptualization of the
underlying application domain. To this end we introduce a process model for the generation of a domain
description. In virtue of its close relation with cognitive activity, this model enables the modeler as well as the
user to comprehend the concepts of the resulting domain in a natural way.
1 Introduction
Is it possible to classify the concepts ‘generated’
during modeling processes in types? By knowing
the kinds of concepts that can be distinguished, we
could make conceptualization more systematic which
in turn may improve its effectiveness (less errors) and
conceptual efficiency (Liu, 2000). To this end we in-
troduce a process model for conceptualization. Our
model can be derived on the basis of an analysis of the
properties of cognitive activity, as it has been shown
at last year ICEIS conference (Sarbo, 2007); and on
the basis of a semiotic analysis of representation, as
it will be developed in this paper. Whereas the first
approach may provide more insight in the computa-
tional aspects of conceptualization as a process, the
second one opens the way towards using the types of
conceptualization events as pigeonholes during prob-
lem specification.
In past research we have shown that our pro-
cess model enables uniform representation in differ-
ent knowledge domains. This is why our approach
may be interesting for organizations involved in mod-
eling processes. The aim of such processes is to make
explicit and reconcile knowledge obtained from dif-
ferent stake holders, in a (semi-)formal model. The
knowledge involved is generated with the aim of real-
izing goals in individual conceptualization processes
that themselves serve a common goal: the ‘genera-
tion’ of a shared, common understanding of a prob-
lem. In virtue of this common goal, conceptualiza-
tion in organizations offers an excellent occasion to
execute control.
The knowledge involved in each individual busi-
ness process is tightly knit with the goal it serves to
realize. This shapes the attitude of the stake holders
of different domains. It is only natural that, as a rule,
they will understand and value other processes from
their own habitual point of view. Reconciliation starts
with the decision to consciously subsume knowledge
needed for the different processes under the common
goal. But this only expresses the intention. In or-
der to realize the intention, it is necessary to explicate
the domain specific knowledge in such a way that the
stake holders of related domains are able to under-
stand and value what is going on. This is where the
uniform modeling potential of our approach may be-
come useful. For, in that case the different stake hold-
ers get acquainted with the form in which knowledge
is conceptualized when their knowledge processes are
modeled. This familiarity with the form comes in
handy when stake holders of different domains par-
take in Information System (IS) building. It is here
that our process model for systematic conceptualiza-
tion fits in. Its main characters are:
1) It reduces the continuous stream of reality to a finite
amount of types of interpretation moments.
2) It conceptualizes hierarchically, not just by means
of collections. The hierarchy is not dictated by a
previously accepted ontology, but arises naturally in
the course of the analysis.
3) Its goal orientedness provides means to ensure ter-
minological consistency by keeping track of the pro-
cesses in which common terms figure.
Below we will present our process model for
systematic conceptualization. Since the model is
founded upon the processual semiotics of the Ameri-
can polymath Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914) we will start
in section 2 with a treatment of some basic notions:
process (2.1) and sign and habit (2.2). This treatment
is also the occasion to argue that our way of conceptu-
alization offers organizations the opportunity to exe-
cute self control. The more technical part of the paper
starts in section 3, in which we recapitulate our model,
including its logical interpretation. An illustrative ex-
ample is presented in section 4. Finally, in section 5
we will draw conclusions.
2 How to control conceptualization?
If we confine our scope just to ER-modeling, it is
possible to say that ER-models are used to create an
accurate reflection of the structure of part of the real
world in a database. But already if we only modestly
extend our scope and ask what did trigger the mod-
eling of a domain, we are forced to a more elaborate
answer. The first thing to ask is what we do when we
model, is it capturing real world events in a reflection
or is it a matter of modeling our organization’s future
interactions with the world? Even with a narrow view
on ER-modeling the answer must be that, at the very
least, it is not only a matter of representation. For, al-
though ER developed in order to remove redundancy
and keep data consistent, if we implement a (normal-
ized) model, we affect the behavior of everybody who
is going to work for some reason with the realized in-
formation system.
With the rapid integration of information systems
across departments, the growing model of entities and
relations became hard to read. Contact with the users’
demands was restored by specifying separate busi-
ness processes, followed by a de-normalization of the
overall ER-model from the perspective of the needs
of the different roles engaged in those processes.
But how to proceed if we do not have a normal-
ized model and/or the domain to be modeled is ex-
tensive, hosting different perspectives, stated in terms
that may be vague or that lead to contradictions, in an
environment where differences of interest seriously
hamper progress? Here controlled conceptualization
may make a difference. In the remainder of this sec-
tion we will deal with our background notions as a
preparation for the presentation of the model with
which we deem controlled conceptualization feasible.
2.1 Processes and conceptualization
The concept of process is central to our approach.
This is not primarily so because conceptualization it-
self can be regarded a process or because it is part of
an embracing process aiming at the realization of an
IS. The primary reason for taking process as a cen-
tral concept resides in the fact that all we feel, think
or do, is only felt, thought or done as part of some
process(es). From the point of view of meaning as
actualized meaning, processes are the basic units of
meaning, not terms or propositions. The latter gen-
eralize over different processes by dissociation from
any particular process. This will be clear if we realize
that disambiguation as a rule proceeds by providing
a proper context, thus embedding the ambiguous sign
in the process intended by the utterer. Stake holders
will be inclined to think about their concepts from the
perspective of the processes in which they are embed-
ded. So, explicating processes is a quite natural start-
ing point for conceptualization. Since processes fig-
ure so prominently in our approach some words about
our Peirce inspired understanding of the concept of
process is called for. Hulswit succinctly summarized
the Peircean concept of process thus (Hulswit, 1999):
A process is “a continuous sequence of events
that derives its unity or internal order (distin-
guishing it from other processes) from a final
cause, which directs the sequence to some end
state which itself may evolve.”
Several notions in this definition deserve some eluci-
dation.
A process is a continuous sequence of events:
a) Continuous because events in a process are not
separate from each other.
b) Events because there are distinguishable parts of
a process that can be articulated as facts expressed
in propositions.
Unity or internal order is derived from a final cause:
a) The goal of the process, the desired end state, pro-
vides the Reason of the process.
b) Only what contributes to the realization of the
goal ought to be part of the model that describes the
process.
The final cause directs the sequence to some end state:
An event starts up a goal oriented habit that governs
the process towards its terminating event.
The end state itself may evolve during the process (re-
cursively):
The terminating event needs not to be fixed before-
hand in detail, it may be general or vague.
In this section we looked at processes in a very
general way, now we zoom in on the different kinds
of aspects that we must distinguish in all the kinds of
sign processes, including those pertinent to IS.
2.2 Signs, habits and conceptualization
Peirce did hold from very early on that we have no
power to think without signs (cf. CP 5.265). 1 But if
every thought always partakes in a sign, then the flow
of thought, as far as it is connected and influential, is
representable by an argument. So, it need not wonder
us that throughout his life he kept refining his thought
on signs, leaving us a tremendous corpus devoted to
the study of signs in many of its aspects. This most
certainly is not the place to trace the development of
that thought or to lay bare the ramifications of the as-
sumption. In the space at our disposal we will not
even have the possibility to deal with the bare essen-
tials of the core of his sign theory, but at the same
time we will have to present an advancement of the
basic theory which comes down to a transfer of the
concept of ‘sheet’ from his logic to his semiotics. We
start with the later and will afterwards introduce the
relevant terminology ‘on the fly’.
In analogy with the ‘Sheet of Assertion’ (SA)
Pierce introduced in the context of his logic (cf. CP
4.396), we introduce a ‘Semiotic Sheet’ (SS) (van
Breemen and Sarbo, 2007). The difference between
the two is that the SA represents what is taken for
granted to be true in the Universe of Discourse by all
participants in an exchange of ideas, while the SS rep-
resents all that is believed by a group of participants or
by an individual. Let us assume that the SS has at least
two modalities. The actual SS holds what at a given
moment actually is believed, it is the state the SS is
in at any given moment. The potential SS contains all
beliefs that may become actualized some time.
Now, under the assumption that all thought is in
signs, lets try to describe what happens if something
demanding attention gets inscribed on a SS in the state
it is actually in. See fig. 1 for a summarization of
technical terms (left) and their approximate counter-
parts in mundane language (right). Although the 9
terms suggest that they are signs on their own, this
is not the case. They are best regarded as analytical
moments that surface if we are going to analyze goal
oriented processes or reasoning.
The terms of fig. 1:
The qualisign position indistinctly involves all that is
needed to reach a conclusion. Analytically it in-
volves what is offering itself for interpretation (the
1A reference to (Peirce, 1931) is given by volume and
paragraph, separated by a point.
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Figure 1: Sign aspects and corresponding mundane terms
effect), the actual state the SS is in and all that may
be contributed by the SS written upon in the process
of interpretation. State and effect appear as indis-
tinct qualities.
The icon position discriminates the state and effect
according to their form, but without any interpreta-
tion. It is the single occurrence of a potential like-
ness. Looked at it from a bottom up perspective the
process can go on in many directions, none of which
is recognized at this point.
The sinsign2 position indicates the co-occurrence of
the state and effect on a particular SS as an actual
event.
The index position indicates the actual connection of
all moments involved in the interpretive process, by
this it expresses the permanence of a process on a SS.
At the same time it expresses the latent connection
between what is actualized in this process and what
is potentially contained in this actualized SS.
The legisign generalizes the occurrence (sinsign) of
the instances of a form (icon). In learning this is
a bottom up process, but if the form is known the
actual event triggers a rule-like habit that classes all
the instances of that form with a type. A legisign
only surfaces by means of its instances, but as a habit
it has a real influence.
The rheme position indicates the moment the form
(icon) in its here and now actuality (sinsign) ad-
dresses the SS in order to retrieve all possible ways
in which to deal with it, to contextualize it, but only
potentially so. Creativity heavily draws upon this
moment: figuring out how to possibly deal with the
input (qualitative possibility).
The symbol position indicates the moment a famil-
iar sign (legisign, involving a sinsign-icon) gets con-
nected (index) with a habit of interpretation that con-
nects the sign implied in the effect with its object.
Object here used as in “What is the object of your
remark?” The stronger this convention, the harder it
is to be creative. At this point however the habit is
still not operational.
The dicent indicates the position in which a specific
2‘Sin’ as in ‘singular’.
possibility is asserted for actual use in the argument
in a particular case. Out of all possible interpreta-
tions one is actually asserted (factual existence).
The argument position indicates at least two mo-
ments. On the one hand it indicates the whole pro-
cess leading to the conclusion/response as its reason,
on the other it states the conclusion/response, ready
to enter a subsequent process.
What does this approach offer to conceptualiza-
tion? In order to establish that it is useful to introduce
a third modality of the SS, the modality of law or oper-
ational habit. What is inscribed on a SS in this modal-
ity has real influence and as such fulfills the essential
function of a sign, according to Peirce:
“It appears to me that the essential function
of a sign is to render inefficient relations ef-
ficient, – not to set them into action, but to
establish a habit or general rule whereby they
will act on occasion” (CP 8.332).
But isn’t that the kind of sign we want to develop if
we are building an IS, at a level as much integrated as
possible? In order to realize that, we regard the differ-
ent stake holders as Semiotic Sheets that contain the
knowledge we need. When we analyze we write the
results on different sheets, for each process to be mod-
eled one. We do this by combining these sheets until
all that is needed for the processes is made explicit.
We merge and sequence the different sheets on a sheet
in which the common goals are regulative. Practical
constraints, conflicts of interest and ambiguities will
arise in the process. But they have a reason and can be
discussed in an understandable way, since they can be
connected to what is going on. That offers prospects
for resolution. The question we pose may be summa-
rized thus: Is it possible to develop a robust strategy
for conceptualization by taking a Peircean semiotic
account of cognitive activity as a starting point?
3 The model
In past research we suggested that Peirce’s nine
types of meaning aspects are generated in each sign
recognition process (Sarbo, 2007). In this section we
restrict ourselves to a brief recapitulation of the basic
ideas.
The appearing sign (external effect) is interact-
ing with the Ss occurring in a state. According to
our model, the recognition of this sign (phenomenon)
can be established through the recognition of the re-
lation between state (A) and effect (B), in the context
of knowledge about earlier interactions (¬A, ¬B) pos-
sessed by the involved Ss. We assume that both state
and effect are presented as input qualities appearing
in a ‘primordial soup’ ([A B]). Sign recognition can be
modeled by a processing schema, as shown in fig. 2.
(1) sorting ([A], [B]): the identification of the two types
of qualities in the ‘primordial soup’;
(2) abstraction (A, B): the separation of the collections
of the two types of qualities;
(3) complementation ((A,¬B), (B,¬A)): the linking of
the qualities with information from the context;
(4) predication ((A,¬B)–(B,¬A)): the establishment of
a relation between the completed qualities.
(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction[~B,~A]A B
[B][A]
(A,~B) (B,~A)
(A,~B) − (B,~A)
[A B]
Figure 2: The processing schema of sign recognition
A logical analysis of our processing schema has
been introduced in (Sarbo, 2007). The results of this
analysis are recapitulated in fig. 3. An essential ele-
ment of a logical interpretation is the abstraction of a
common meaning of the two types of input qualities,
which is the concept of a logical variable. Because
we have two types of qualities, which are indepen-
dent, the logical interpretation requires the introduc-
tion of two variables. These are denoted by A (state)
and B (effect).
~A+~B
~A*~B
A is B
A+~B,~A+B
A*~B,~A*B A*~B+~A*B
A+B A*B
A,B,~A,~B
A*B+~A*~B
Figure 3: The logical interpretation of sign recognition
4 An example
There are two dimensions along which our the-
ory of conceptualization can be explored. The first is
related to its potential for merging knowledge (con-
cepts) obtained by the different stake holders repre-
senting different views (Lankhorst et al., 2005). This
can be illustrated with the specification of a common
problem by a conceptual specialist and some domain
expert(s). Full individual specifications, each express-
ing a certain point of view, are merged to a single
meaningful relation, by unifying concepts of identi-
cal meaning aspects to a single sign, through coordi-
nation. The second way of exploration capitalizes on
the potential of the theory to be applied recursively,
which is beneficial for the conceptualization of com-
plex phenomena. This section gives an illustration of
such a problem. Let us emphasize that both types of
exploration are a direct consequence of the uniform
representation provided by the theory outlined in this
paper.
4.1 Conceptualization of a complex
problem
Assume our task is the generation of a meaningful
representation of a company’s strategy. From an ab-
stract point of view such a strategy can be charac-
terized by the company’s reaction on supply and de-
mand. According to the theory of this paper, such a
reaction can be conceptualized as a relation between
supply and demand where supply can be interpreted
as the products produced by the company, which are
available for some time (state), and demand as the
suddenly appearing request dictated by the customers
(effect).
The simultaneously appearing supply and demand
(input qualities) define our company involved in a
business event. The interpretation of the two types of
qualities in themselves (individual analysis) provides
us with a definition of A and B,3 and through the in-
terpretation of the relation between them (relational
analysis) we may obtain a meaningful conceptualiza-
tion of our company’s reaction to the input event. That
relation may also rely on complementary factors like
the economic perspective taken, either profit maxi-
mization or purchasers satisfaction, which views in
turn are intimately related to the more primitive con-
cepts of price and selling events, that themselves can
be specified as phenomena. The next section is an at-
tempt to introduce a specification for selling events;
an analogous treatment of the concept of price is left
to the reader.
4.2 Nested phenomenon: selling event
A selling event is between a dealer and a customer.
The specification below is given from the dealer’s per-
spective; a description from the purchaser’s point of
view is possible, but it may be less general, as the pur-
3We refer to the status of a sign by means of the corre-
sponding logical expression.
chaser’s motivation for buying or not buying a product
can be more difficult to set out.
We assume that a selling event, as a phenomenon,
is defined by the purchaser’s selection of certain prod-
ucts and services. The products can be interpreted as
a state, in which, the services appear as an effect. For
example, dealer and customer are having a conversa-
tion while they are looking at a collection of products,
when suddenly the dealer recognizes (e.g. ‘sees’ in
a saccade), the purchaser’s selection of the services
he or she wishes to be delivered with the products.
Additionally we assume that a selling event may also
be subject to complementary factors like the different
forms of the transfer of ownership and the various ju-
dicial conditions a service may have to comply with.
The goal of this section is not the analysis of a
concrete selling event, however. Our focus is on the
interpretation of the relation between product and ser-
vice, in general. Accordingly, we will assume that the
input contains abstract qualities, which are: product
(A), service (B), form of ownership (¬A) and judi-
cial conditions (¬B). For example, ¬A may refer to
purchase, lease or rental, and ¬B to copyright, know-
how and organizational conditions (e.g. a computer
network, as a product, can be sold only as a whole,
not in parts). The representation of abstract concepts,
as qualities, is a non trivial question that we cannot
discuss in detail, because of lack of space. The ab-
stract concepts of selling are introduced as stages of
the recognition process of an abstract selling event, as
a sign (cf. fig. 2).
[A]=A+B: A product (A) can be sold with a service
(B); or, a service (B), for example, a know-how, can
be available through a certain product (A).
[B]=A∗B: A product may provide a certain service
only; or, a service can be available only in combina-
tion with a certain product (product-service depen-
dency, as an actual event).
[¬A,¬B]=¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B: The relation between the
complementary factors of selling events like the var-
ious forms of ownership and the corresponding judi-
cial issues (¬A+¬B), and how those forms of own-
ership are regulated by law (¬A∗¬B).
A=A∗¬B, ¬A∗B: Product specification like catalog
information about products (A∗¬B) and services
(¬A∗B), in general.
B=A∗¬B+¬A∗B: The reconciliation of purchaser’s
need for products and services, from the dealer’s
point of view. This is the concept of the habitual
way of bargaining, which is a law-like relation or
rule between products (A∗¬B) and services (¬A∗B)
that can be sold in combination. This rule includes
the possibility that products and services can be sold
independently from each other (in conformity with
the ‘or’ operation in the logical expression of B).
For example, one may buy A without B (A∗¬B) or,
B without A (¬A∗B), or both. Notice that in this
case the law-like relation identified as ‘bargaining’,
a concept that most of us are familiar with, is auto-
matically revealed by this conceptualization process
(except its name, of course). This indicates that in
cases in which we are not familiar with the concepts
they are generated by the model.
(A,¬B)=A+¬B, ¬A+B: The interrelated product and
service are actualized as constituents of a selling
event. This includes the full specification of prod-
uct and service according to the purchaser as well
as the dealer, tacitly implicating their agreement (cf.
bargaining in context).
(B,¬A)=A∗B+¬A∗¬B: The characteristic property in-
volved in any selling event, defined by a suitable
combination of product and service (A∗B) and noth-
ing else (¬A∗¬B) or, alternatively, the relation be-
tween the selected product and service (A∗B), in the
light of their ownership forms and judicial condi-
tions like the transfer of ownership through leasing
or contract (¬A∗¬B).
(A,¬B)–(B,¬A)=A is B: The meaningful description of
the input phenomenon, as a selling event.
4.3 Main phenomenon continued
The meaning of the nested phenomenon can be repre-
sented in the nesting phenomenon, degenerately, as
a quality. As a result, the meaningful concept of
a ‘selling event’ is reduced to complementary infor-
mation (¬B)4 mediating supply and demand to their
interpretation as the company’s supply and the cus-
tomers’ demand and, finally, to a meaningful rep-
resentation of our company’s strategy. The context
of price (¬A) and selling events (¬B), is an expres-
sion of their close interaction in a market mechanism
(¬A∗¬B), but also of their possible influence as addi-
tional regulative factors, like environmental and polit-
ical demand (¬A+¬B).
The interpretation of the context along a contin-
uum marked by ‘liberal’, on the one side, and ‘state
controlled’, on the other, may provide a representa-
tion of our company (‘A is B’ as a conclusion), as a
more commercial profit oriented enterprise or a more
non-profit organization, respectively.
4Now ¬B, but also A, B and ¬A refer to the qualities of
the nesting phenomenon.
5 Conclusions
For systematic conceptualization of a domain, a
process model is needed. This has several reasons.
It minimizes unwanted ambiguity of the terms used
by consistently extracting them from the processes in
which they function. It enhances communication with
and between stake holders about their domains by the
use of concepts in context. And it facilitates strategic
decision making in an early stage of IS building by
enabling the re-thinking of the processes that make
up any organization; after all goals can be reached in
different ways.
The approach presented in this paper is closely re-
lated to cognitive activity interpreted as a sign pro-
cess. The finite amount of types of meaningful inter-
pretation moments (cf. fig. 1) facilitates the develop-
ment of a common language between stake holders,
as well as between stake holders and end-users. The
order relation between the interpretation moments as
well as between the processes increases the possibility
to control conceptualization. The goal oriented nature
of our processual model is well equipped to uncover
hidden tensions by systematically keeping check of
the relations between ends and means.
REFERENCES
Hulswit, M. (1999). From Cause to Causation : A
Peircean Perspective, volume 90 of Philosophi-
cal Studies Series. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Lankhorst, M., van der Torre, L., Proper, H., Arbab,
F., and Steen, M. (2005). Viewpoints and visual-
isation. In Lankhorst, M., editor, Enterprise ar-
chitecture at work: Modelling, Communication,
and Analysis, pages 147–190, Berlin (Germany).
Springe-Verlag.
Liu, K. (2000). Semiotics in Information Systems En-
gineering. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge (UK).
Peirce, C. (1931). Collected Papers of Charles
Sanders Peirce. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Sarbo, J. (2007). On the logic underlying common
sense. In Cardoso, J., Cordeiro, J., and Fil-
ipe, J., editors, ICEIS, pages 395–400, Funchal,
Madeira (Portugal). INSTICC.
van Breemen, A. and Sarbo, J. (2007). Sign processes
and the sheets of semeiosis (Ss). In Liu, K., ed-
itor, 10th International Conference on Complex-
ity in Organisational and Technological Systems
(ICOS), pages 89–98, Sheffield (UK).
